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BEFORE CYBERSPACE:
LEGAL TRANSITIONS IN PROPERTY RIGHTS REGIMES
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN*
Everyone knows that the information age is fast upon us, and
that it has worked and will work major transformations in who we are
and what we do. A quick glance through my resume will reveal that I
am not the man to chronicle those movements as we wade into the
complications of intellectual property, cyberspace, and the
information age. The only reason why I am qualified to speak after
dinner at this event is that I have been invited to do so by my friend
(and, as of the date of this publication, colleague) Lisa Bernstein, who
thought that a general overview of the role of the law of cyberspace in
the intellectual firmament should not be immersed in jargon and
technical details. I was her precommitment strategy. So she told me
to pick a topic that was sufficiently vague to allow me to say whatever
I chose, and to that request I promptly acceded.
Unfortunately, my conclusion is all too iffy (and all too prudent)
for my taste. It is that the innovations of technology neither preclude
nor require fundamental transformations in the legal regime that
governs them. In all cases the key issue can be framed as follows:
because transitions in legal regimes are always costly and sometimes
go astray, can one show that the rules of the past are so ill-fitting that
some conscious and costly deviation from them is appropriate? No
categorical answer is possible, for so much depends on how ill-fitting
the old legal system is, how painful the transition is, and how well the
new system would operate. The best we can do is to establish a weak
presumption in favor of the continuation of the old legal order, given
the inevitable costs of reorientation. Yet presumptions solve less than
we hope because the diverse circumstances under which they are
tested resist any uniform legal theory. With these inevitable caveats,
this talk will address the future through the past. I shall talk about
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some of the historical antecedents to the coordination problems of
our modern information age. Even though the technology is novel,
the basic premise is not.
With that said, my next move is an abrupt transition of my own.
The attitude that I bring to these questions is heavily influenced by
my own early legal education. My initial legal studies were at Oxford,
which makes me an instant outlier. There the first course I ever
studied was Roman Law. My first topic was Roman Contract Law,
where my initial assignment asked me to trace the evolution of the
contract of stipulatio: unilateral verbal contracts in which the
correspondence between question and answer created the obligation.
Even the innocent contract of stipulation had its technical side: what
should be done with agreements at a distance when verbal
communication was not possible? The introduction of writing
provoked an important transition in contractual regimes. Early on,
writing became evidence of the oral transaction, and over time a
substitute for it, which should be expected as writing became cheaper
and more widespread.
From my initial foray into Roman Law, I have always had an
interest in historical materials as windows through which to examine
the modern age. Often my instinct is that changes in technology are
advanced as a pretext for a transformation from one set of legal rules
to another, when the real reasons for change rest on a longstanding
dissatisfaction with the previous rules. My views on this issue were
first crystallized in a 1980 paper entitled The Static Conception of the
Common Law,' which maintained that technological changes did not
fuel changes in legal rules. What was good enough for the second
century A.D. is also good enough for us. Indeed, the position still
seems sound on such critical matters as the basis of tort liability and
remoteness of damage. The challenge is to give functional reasons for
antiquarian preferences. Even in 1980 I was aware of some
exceptions to the basic principle that the optimal legal rules are
invariant to social changes. Now my intention is to revisit the subject
by examining whether and where technology drove legal transitions,
and did so in a beneficial fashion.
This discussion begins with property rights in ourselves, including
our talents, athletic abilities, moods, and dispositions. Following
those are the rights that we have in things external to the self, both




tangible and intangible. Is the ideal configuration of rights in these
departments subject to change as a function of technology?
Start with individual talents and labor, and my categorical answer
is "no." No one can, or will, find a change in technology that drives
us away from the baseline of individual autonomy or self-control.
Short of wartime necessities, I cannot think of any reason that
requires a deviation from the strong individual rights that allow
individuals to control the use of their talents and to pick out the
individuals with whom they wish to associate and the terms on which
they wish to conduct their affairs. I recognize that many earlier
regimes placed limitations on the individual's capacity to contract-
women and slaves are obvious examples-but I think that those rules
had as little normative justification then as they do now. Strong
autonomy rules for labor and natural talents work well because it is
very difficult for any single person to obtain, except by illegitimate
government coercion, a stranglehold on the opportunities made
available to other individuals. The position therefore is one that
embraces free entry and exit on both sides of labor and associational
markets. Make no mistake about it, entry and exit are the best
guarantors of choice for all persons; the threat to leave is credible, is
cheap to enforce, and produces responses that induce most people to
cooperate most of the time. Today, as the cost of contracting drops,
and the range of trading partners expands, the autonomy principle is,
empirically, better grounded than it has ever been before.
How strange therefore it is that in recent years the forces of
regulation have made their greatest strides in labor markets! Indeed,
it is precisely because government intervention has limited the range
of effective choice in many labor markets that we have needed
additional regulations to offset the monopoly power so created. The
linchpin of modern labor law in the United States (and elsewhere, I
dare say) is to confer monopoly power on labor unions, which in turn
requires correlative state-imposed limitations on their ability to
negotiate at will. The definition of that offset is not subject to any
precise metric, and so the obligation to bargain "in good faith" is
born.
The advent of the information age makes state-sanctioned
monopolization less necessary (and less effective, I might add)
because cheap information will increase the range of potential trading
partners. Cheap information will lead away from large firms with
massive labor forces, all of which operate in fixed proportions; it will
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lead to just-in-time contracting, temporary services, consulting firms,
and a bewildering network of semi-permanent and spot transactions.
It will also lead to a change in the content of the underlying
exchanges. The blacksmith of one generation becomes the web site
engineer of the next. We should welcome this proliferation of
arrangements, but we do not have to change the law of contract.
People will still want to be paid for services rendered, so that meeting
the requirement of consideration will pose no difficulty in the vast
range of routine transactions. Surely some doctrine of offer and
acceptance will be with us until the end of time. What should change
are the kinds of offers made and accepted.
The changes in the terms of contracting will not be arbitrary.
One obvious point is that information counts for more in an
information age-at least in the sense that a greater fraction of our
total social wealth will be tied up in information than in previous
times. One hard question is whether parties should be allowed to
restrict the movement of labor in order to protect the secrets that
they have entrusted with their employees. The choices here are
difficult because the turnover in labor necessarily compromises
exclusive rights in trade secrets that relate to everything from
technical processes to customer lists. So the hard cases involve the
new terms of labor contracts, at a time when secret information is of
far greater value than ever before.
Yet all firms will confront a de facto veil of ignorance problem.
They want to rein in their own employees so that valuable proprietary
information will not find its way into a rival's hands, yet they need to
have access to employees now working for other firms, who could
easily be bound by similar restrictions. A general principle of free
movement of labor both benefits and hurts all firms; such is also the
case with a system that honors covenants not to compete or to work
with a rival. The only question is which set of inconveniences bites
more deeply, and in our high-tech time, it seems that the free
movement of labor will win out in the end.
The best explanation for this outcome is that firms can find other
ways (always at a cost) to protect their secrets. They can divide their
work product across several teams, so that the value of information
will be less apparent to the new employer who only sees a small piece
of the overall picture. Employers can offer compensation packages,
whether in cash or stock options, to employees that are back-loaded,
so that payment comes only after the new technology reaches the
[Vol. 73:1137
BEFORE CYBERSPACE
market-so long as the employee sticks with the venture. They can
count happily on the general depreciation in the value of trade secrets
as well, owing to the furious rate of progress within the industry. I
would of course enforce explicit covenants not to compete to the
extent that they make the restrictions clear. But employees know
that mobility is a way of life in the high-tech industry, so my bet is
that prospective employees will resist these covenants in most cases:.
carrots will, at a rough guess, be more effective than sticks. The
traditional rules of contract law should prove equal to the legal
challenge of preserving control over proprietary information.
The control of labor has another important dimension in the
protection of intellectual property, which is one of the outgrowths of
ordinary labor. The ancient world had no regimes to govern
copyrights and patents. Without systems of mass production, the
creator of an intellectual work had to pay someone else to produce it.
Only when the printing press replaced the scribe did the balance of
trade run in the opposite direction and give rise to the need to protect
intellectual property. The temptation is to imitate the rules on
exclusion for physical property. Yet it is a temptation that, to some
extent, must be resisted, given that the additional spur to the creation
of intellectual property reduces the likelihood of its wide
dissemination once produced.
Those complications take over the teaching of a course in patents
and copyrights. For our purposes, the central point is to recognize
that transitions in legal regimes have also taken place with physical
property. It is appropriate to say a few words about them. Last year I
asked my seminar in telecommunications what technological change
they thought had the greatest impact on the organization of property
rights regimes. Refrigeration was what one gifted student answered.
He had a point, of course, because the new technology made it
feasible for slaughterhouses to move west from Chicago, closer to
cattle country. That said, I told him to go back further and to think
on a grander scale. My choice, hardly novel, was the shift from a
hunter-gatherer society to an agricultural one. The most profound
effect of this transformation was that it led to the rise of permanent
individual property rights in land. Before agriculture, no one invested
heavily in improving land, so exclusive property rights tended to
cluster in chattels of various kinds, on which labor had been
expended. Once cultivation of land became desirable, however,
permanent rights in land had to be devised to secure a return on the
1998]
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initial investment in removing stones, building fences, and plowing
fields.
"Sow, that you may reap" catches the agricultural origins of
property rights, but, ironically, it understates the proposition by
suggesting that property rights are good so long as they last for a
single growing cycle. Yet clearing land and building fences are
improvements that come at a great cost and require a longer payout
period. So this agricultural metaphor is a somewhat imperfect
expression of the recognition that long-term property arrangements
are needed to supply the proper incentives to invest. From these
technological changes came Blackstone's axiomatic version of the fee
simple: "as that sole and despotic dominion which one man claims
and exercises over the external things of the world, in total exclusion
of the rights of any other individual in the universe."2
The pattern of behavior here is not confined to common law
institutions. Rather the economic forces are so powerful that they
force a convergence among legal systems that have few common
antecedents. The Hawaiian situation with the great mehele (the land
division around 1850)3 showed a remarkable parallel. The system of
communal lands was not able to survive the arrival of western
investment. No one would build extensive private holdings on
common lands. Some division, therefore, was needed to put the once-
common resources in the hands of the private individuals who could
give durable title to third party interests.
A similar transition took place with respect to the capture of wild
animals. When capture was solely for consumption and not for sale, a
rule that allowed unlimited hunting worked quite well. The use
limitations placed an effective constraint on the level of capture. But
once potential sales to Europeans expanded the short-term gains
from capture, this structural inhibition was removed, and the danger
of extinction from overhunting became real. In that setting, a shift to
a regime that gave individuals hunting territories might have cost
more to organize and enforce, but it also generated higher sustainable
yields. The well-rehearsed Demsetz story on the soundness of the
transition makes sense, even if he overlooked some of the bumps
along the way.4 Transitions, it should never be forgotten, have clear
2. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2 (1766).
3. See Public Access Shoreline Haw. v. Hawaii County Planning Comm'n, 903 F.2d 1246,
1271-72 (Haw. 1995) for details.




allocative gains, but they carry with them substantial risks of intrigue
and abuse. The greater whole could be advanced while some small
players are wiped out. We should not ignore these pathological
byproducts simply because the overall process seems to work well.
The theme of transitions is equally important in dealing with
water rights. In situations in which the private demand for water is
limited, groups have little need to place formal legal constraints on
consumption. The shift to agriculture placed heavier demands on
water consumption, and the rise in scarcity brought a need to
reexamine the structure of legal rights. The early riparian system of
proration was not an ideal allocation device, but its simplicity worked
well to assure that all had minimal supplies in times of scarcity, and
shared in the bounty of good times. That system prevented
systematic private actions that could destroy the value of a river as a
commons for transportation, aesthetics, fishing, and bathing. In those
western settings where riparians could not make the best use of water
(because their lands were atop a gorge) and where ranchers had to
make heavy investments to use the water they removed, prior
appropriation systems took hold. These systems tended to downplay
the importance of instream use, and set up the same set of transition
problems found with land and wild animals. But they did represent
on balance a sensible response to differences in both topology and
technology.
In sum, by looking at the evolution of property rights in land,
animals, and water, a simple pattern emerges: where investment must
proceed consumption, systems of durable property rights are
necessary for social stability. No legal system could rely on a system
of usufructuary rights. It is quite correct to argue that bountiful
natural resources and domesticated animals and plants are
preconditions for the shift from primitive to modern society. Yet it is
perhaps too easy to overlook the other side of the coin, as I think was
done by Jared Diamond in Guns, Germs, and Steel,5 by ignoring the
legal regimes that govern resource use. The abundance of resources
can be dissipated without effective property regimes to govern their
use.
5. JARED DIAMOND, GUNS, GERMS, AND STEEL: THE FATES OF HUMAN SOCIETIES
(1997).
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THE RETURN OF THE COMMONS
The program that I have described thus far is one of
privatization. It is easy to assume that technology and legal
advancement push uniformly in that direction, but that would be a
mistake. Land and other forms of property have mixed uses, and the
ideal configuration of the rights for one use may be inappropriate for
another use. To add to the difficulty, it could well be that both uses
have value when conducted simultaneously. Is it possible to find
property systems that are flexible enough to adapt to these
conditions?
The answer seems to be yes. With respect to land, agriculture is
a compact use, while hunting could commence with a chase that starts
in one location and ends in another. The creation of easements in
land, which allow the chase to continue so long as the crops are not
disturbed, is an affront to Blackstone's principle of absolute
exclusion. Yet the rise of customary practices of just this sort shows
that it is possible to devise sound economic solutions that work
because every member of the community can take advantage of the
practice. The powerful dose of reciprocity of interest explains why we
can rise above principle and qualify Blackstone's vision of property
rights in ways that improve the lot of us all. The resulting mixture of
property rights represents the kind of trade-offs that we must live
with in all our affairs. The system of concentrated property rights
that allows for new construction hampers various forms of movement.
What is true for hunting is also true for communication and
cyberspace. So we move one step closer to our computer world.
The developments with hunting in the seventeenth century
recurred on a far grander scale with transportation and
communication in the nineteenth century. Square enclaves and castle
strongholds were of little use for railroads and telegraph. These were
industries that required linkages from one place to another. They did
not require concentrated investments in single identifiable locations.
The great challenge was to figure out the regime of property rights
that was most congenial to the emergence of these technologies. The
outcome involved mixed regimes that could take into account the
need for both conventional and special ownership. With that came
special franchises, common carrier obligations, and rate of return
regulation, precisely because the ethic of exclusion could not carry
over into the world of network industries.
Yet even here, the problem has more prosaic antecedents.
[Vol. 73:1137
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Highways are networks with open access. These require public
investment and decisions on such matters as location and size.
Someone has to determine where they should be built, and how the
land should be assembled. The holdout potential of a single
individual who possesses some critical parcel of land is something that
calls forth the use of condemnation power and brings in tow the full
range of questions on takings and valuation. In this context it does no
good to lament the inability of government agencies to assess private
preferences and to make collective decisions. The Hayekian bias
against planning certainly has its place when private solutions are
available, as is the case with the allocation of broadcast and other
communications frequencies. 6 But the criticism of planning has to be
directed only towards its excesses. Network industries often create
the necessity for some collective response; the only question is what
kind. The general sort of skepticism about public knowledge of
private preferences cuts too deeply, for it precludes any estimation of
better and worse choices in system design and financing. Although
the case law doubtless contains some serious errors, a close
examination of the rules governing special assessments for
infrastructure improvement as these emerged in the post-Civil War
period, would pay handsome dividends. Who decides (and by what
vote) what projects should be undertaken? Who decides how to
apportion the cost of an open access system that provides differential
benefits to the individuals who live in close proximity to key elements
of the overall system? What adjustments should be made to take into
account differences in the intensity of use, such as between
automobiles and trucks? It is not enough just to have differential
rates; it is also important that the differentials reflect the actual
differences in the burdens that different user classes place on the
system as a whole. If one twenty-ton truck causes ten times the
damage of ten two-ton cars, then the appropriate tariff differentials
should not be ten to one, but 100 to one.
Railroads present different challenges. Only a limited number of
firms will gain access to the network, which must be integrated to
allow the free movement of cars. By the same token, ordinary
shippers have to be able to gain access to the freight and passenger
cars even if they cannot gain direct access to the road itself. The
6. See generally FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1944); F. A. HAYEK,
THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY (1960). But see Richard A. Epstein, Hayekian Socialism, 58
MD. L. REv. 271 (1999) for a criticism of this view.
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development of that integrated network again requires estimation of
costs and benefits of participation that do not mesh with Blackstone's
model of exclusive property.
The question still arises whether it is possible to graft on private
property systems to common property arrangements. Fortunately, I
think that the answer to this question is yes. The pattern of
development with roads and rails shows how this can be done. Let us
suppose that one has a network of roads to which all people have the
right of access. The natural temptation is to assume that the only
individuals who want to connect to the network are those who have
their cars parked in their garages. That may well be a common case,
but surely it is not the only one. A private association of homeowners
has to have access to the public roads. But it can certainly post guards
at the entrance gates to see that only members and their guests enter
the subdivision. But the subdivision is in fact a second local commons
to which all the association's members have access and for which they
have to pay some appropriate maintenance assessments. There are,
in effect, ways to hook networks to networks.
The principle is capable of extension. If it can be done once, it
can be done many different times. This one feature allows for
expansion of the overall system in ways that reduce the fraction of the
system that has to be open to all. The creation of these independent
subnetworks thus increases flexibility in the operation of the whole
system while reducing the level of public law needed to guide the
formation of the subnetworks. Indeed the solutions that are adopted
to handle the local bottlenecks in these privately-created commons
might help with the larger public problem by giving us some guidance
in structuring the overall system. And I have no doubt that the
percentage of individuals who are hooked into these subnetworks will
increase on the Internet, as has happened with the homeowners'
associations.
The integration of public and private systems of course takes
place in telecommunications when any business installs an exchange
network inside its office. I think that academic lawyers should pay
more attention to the emergence of network industries, and to the
common carrier rules that govern them. Fortunately, I expect that
more attention will be directed to the way the 1996 Telecommunica-
tions Act has fundamentally changed the structure created under the
1934 Communications Act. In dealing with the elaborate rules for
interconnection among the various classes of carriers, it is important
[Vol. 73:1137
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to remember that these are modern outgrowths of similar problems
that arose toward the end of the nineteenth century. In addition, the
common carrier law has a long tradition of universal service, which
itself has been understood in two separate ways. The first is that all
persons should be allowed access to the network, but no class of users
should be required to subsidize another. Here the point of legal
intervention is to overcome the coordination problems that define
network industries. In contrast, the modern view, which has been
more aggressively promoted under section 254 of the present Tele-
communications Act, regards redistribution and subsidy as it raison
d'atre, only to promote the usual response of excessive demand in the
absence of rationing by price.7 But the problem of cross-subsidy is
both more difficult to identify and more difficult to ferret out in
network industries precisely because the Blackstone model of
exclusive property no longer describes any basic features of the
system.
Yet even if we are intent on avoiding subsidies, it is very difficult
to figure out the proper pattern of pricing for these network services.
The front end costs are substantial; yet the return on the investment is
determined at least in part by the rates permitted under regulation.
There have been a number of approaches to this problem: sometimes
rate of return is calculated off the cost of the original investment,
leaving the ratepayers with the risk of poor investment choices. In
other cases, a higher rate of return is allowed on a smaller rate base;
now the public utility takes the risk that future investments will go
awry. There is no doubt that the model of exclusive property rights
lends itself to the emergence of pure competitive industries in a way
that is just not possible-notwithstanding the hype to the contrary-
in network settings.
It is also clear that the emergence of these network industries
created unanticipated pressures on constitutional doctrines. The
classical tradeoff is simple to state and hard to solve.8 Keep the rates
low to avoid monopoly gouging by the providers, and the law
increases the risk of confiscating the invested capital of the regulated
industry. Set the rates high enough to avoid that confiscation, and the
firm might well be able to reap monopoly profits that would deter
7. See Mike Mills, FCC Pares School Internet Program, WASH. POST, June 13,1998, at Dl;
Seth Schiesel, Budget Is Cut for a Plan to Put Schools and Libraries On Line, N.Y. TIMES, June
13, 1998, at A8.
& See Duquesne Light v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299 (1989).
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efficient use of the system. That difficulty just does not emerge in the
world with exclusive rights in property that firms are able to
competitively price.
The proper intellectual stance in this setting is one of ceaseless
marginal adjustment. Never seek perfection because you will not find
it; never give up because improvements are always possible.
Recognize that it is often dangerous to tinker with a system that
works, but equally dangerous to keep a system of rate regulation
unresponsive to major changes in technology (e.g., the introduction of
cellular phones) that could obviate some of the major costs associated
with the operation of the system (e.g., a single monopoly supplier of
the "last mile" of the system). Strong libertarian dogmatism has to be
tempered in dealing with these questions of network design and rate
regulation.
The problems of rate regulation carry with them serious ironies.
The level of interconnection that one sees in telecommunications, for
example, seems to cry out for national regulation of the integrated
network. If ever there was an area that boosted the usual truisms
about the integrated and interdependent economy, it is telecommuni-
cations. It is here that one should make the strongest case for the
1937 constitutional revolution over the scope of the commerce power.
Yet telecommunications turns out to be an area in which the
preservation of state jurisdiction over local phone business was
systematically and rigorously guarded in the 1996 Act.9
No one claims that this is a constitutional principle today, but it
does show that the driving force behind the Commerce Clause
regulation was political and not technical. It is possible to make sure
that individual states do not form barricades against communications
across state lines without having to regulate directly the
communications that take place within state borders. In this sense,
the questions of jurisdiction come to ape the problems of property
law. We have both the need for localism (as with private property)
and for federalism (as with common networks). The ultimate
equilibrium therefore cannot favor one extreme over the other.
Rather it depends on a sound matching of property regime with
resource type. Blackstone's vision of private property cannot, and did
9. Since this speech was given, the Supreme Court decided the jurisdictional question
under the 1996 Act in favor of the F.C.C. But I still think (as someone who consulted with the
Regional Bell Operating Ccompanies on this case) that the 1996 Act did nothing to alter the
traditional distribution of power between the F.C.C. and the state commissions. See AT&T
Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 119 S. Ct. 721, 733 (1999).
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not, survive a serious structural holdout problem.
The inability to maintain regimes of private property in network
industries carries with it important economic consequences. It is not
possible to maintain the illusion of perfect competition in these
industries, including cyberspace. It is just too risky to allow a single
person or firm to occupy a stranglehold position with respect to the
operation of the system, whether in telecommunications or in
cyberspace. The introduction of the communication component has
transformed computers from stand-alone Blackstone machines into a
network industry which, in its own way, will have to make peace with
the coordination problems that were first endemic to railroads and
telephones. With telecommunications, there seems to be some
government willingness to subsidize alternative carriers. Do we adopt
the same policy with respect to Internet communications, and, if so,
how does it manifest itself? Anyone who examines the fine print of
the Telecommunications Act will not assume that state intervention
carries with it an easy response.
In telecommunications, the shift was from the world of the 1982
Modified Final Judgment," which created the local exchange
monopolies who were under a duty to provide access to long distance
carriers. The weaknesses in the system concerned the rates charged
to end-use customers and the access fees charged for long distance
calls. The newer system allows entry into local markets, but its
Achilles heel is in determining the appropriate level of
interconnection charges. Both of these systems have government
mandated exchanges at prices that are set, or at least reviewed, by the
state. Do we want to introduce that level of complexity into the
cyberspace business, when the rate of innovation is such that the
system we regulate today could be drastically transformed tomorrow?
In addition, we must recognize that competition in network
businesses requires explicit levels of cooperation. The level of service
that you supply to your customers depends in part on the level of
service that your competitor supplies to his customers. The entire
system thus requires cooperation in the maintenance of the system as
well as competition in getting the larger fraction of the available
business. In this setting, a firm might want to drive its rival out of
business. If so, it must do so in a somewhat unusual way because of
the social unacceptability of interruption in service to customers of
10. United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982).
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failing firms: Takeover, not liquidation, becomes necessary.
The problems with network industries are difficult for another
reason. They tend to spill across separate jurisdictions. Which of
those jurisdictions gets to regulate the operation of that industry, and
why, become central questions. Once again the novelty of the
technology should not blind us to the historical frequency of the
problem. One of the classical issues of constitutional law under the
dormant (or negative) Commerce Clause involves the coordination of
federal and state power. It has long been understood that the federal
government may regulate under the Commerce Clause over
navigation and communication among the states. Yet it is equally
clear that these network industries have local components that attract
the interest of state regulators. Where the federal government
chooses to assert its powers, it will prevail. Often, however, it is silent
on these matters, and the issue arises whether, within these "great
silences of the Constitution,"'" the states retain power to regulate in
response to local police power concerns.
That issue arose with both railroads and highways. One
representative case is Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona,'12 where the
question was whether the state could impose length limitations on the
trains running through it in order to advance the safety of local
workers, as perceived by state authorities. The cost of this solution is
for through-carriers to reconfigure their trains going in and out of the
state (which itself raises safety risks), or to allow that single state that
requires the shortest trains to set the standards for the entire nation.
No per se rule came out of this trade-off, as the Court sought to
balance the competing interests. In retrospect, what seemed decisive
was that Arizona could point to nothing distinctive in its local
topography and conditions that required deviation from the
nationwide orientation. The case did not present, as did the earlier
decision of South Carolina v. Barnwell," a situation where the local
roads were sufficiently narrow and dangerous that shorter trucks were
required.
Here, it was an idiosyncratic judgment in response to
standardized train conditions that led the United States Supreme
Court to find that the federal interest trumped the local one. One
clue to that result is that the Supreme Court clearly switched grounds
11. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 535 (1949).
12. 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
13. 303 U.S. 177 (1938).
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on the relative weight of federal and state interests after the
introduction of the federal interstate highway program of 1956. Once
the national roads were standardized on key safety dimensions, the
willingness to allow individual states to deviate on the length of truck-
trailer combinations was reduced, if only because the roads started to
look more like railroad tracks.14 And in the end, what happened
there could well happen in cyberspace. The default rules leave too
much to the imagination and to the vagaries of litigation. In their
stead, one places a permanent federal institutional structure that
passes on the need for deviations from the standardized federal
rules.15 The unmistakable subtext is that the presumption is now
more firmly established for national uniformity over local control.
The same questions of coordination can take place on the Net,
and will ultimately be resolved by the same lamentable balancing
tests that were used to reconcile the national demands for a coherent
transportation network with the local desires to respond to their
distinctive situations. These tests will most likely be used in the local
regulation of the content of information that is placed on the Net
outside the local jurisdiction. As with the train cases, the nationalists
among us will argue that any form of local regulation will necessarily
set the standards for every other state within the system, even if the
national consensus is heavily weighted in the other direction.
Information travels across the wires at the speed of light, and it can be
resent and redirected far more rapidly than freight in transit. Thus,
we have a strong national interest in the open network free of nagging
local regulation.
But, as is befitting for this industry, the local considerations may
well be stronger, at least if we continue to believe that we have
serious variations in national life and culture. The Supreme Court, in
dealing with obscenity, has said more than once that local community
standards must be taken into account in deciding on the propriety of
various restrictions, and if these are thought to vary widely by state,
then we have relatively strong interests on both sides of the scale and
a consequent level of bitterness no matter which way the law resolves
the issue. The battle, therefore, over regulation will take place at two
levels: substance and jurisdiction. My own prediction is that the
outcome we reached with respect to the interstate highways might
14. See Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981).




well be replicated with content regulation over the wires. The issue
will be resolved at a national level. What substantive solution will
emerge is anyone's guess, owing to the intractable conflict of visions
between those who see government regulation as blatant censorship
and those who see it as the exercise of traditional police power
regulation over obscenity and pornography. It is very difficult to take
a principled position that neither the federal nor the state
governments have any role in controlling child pornography viewed
within their respective jurisdictions.
There is only one way to avoid these difficulties, and that is to
reduce the level of common interdependence that is found on the
networks. One of the great virtues of a system of exclusive property
rights in the Blackstone tradition is that it allows people with
fundamentally different ways of thought to go their separate ways.
On a public highway or beach, for example, someone has to set the
standards of dress, and often nudists will come out second best in the
contest. With private beaches and communities, however, the local
standard can be set in defiance of the general norm, so that global
minorities can become local majorities. In general, that is a healthy
trend which we should applaud-if only we could find a way to bring
it about.
That is where technology comes in. It will be a great advantage if
Internet Service Providers (or for that matter, users) can block those
sites that they regard as unsuitable for their own audiences. Once
those protocols are established, then the private ability to wall off the
world privately reduces the need to determine the content that goes
over the general wires. We no longer have to worry about finding the
sensitive political mean, and can instead have extensive traffic that
can be privately monitored and controlled. As in so many other
cases, what starts out as an intractable problem of collective choice
can be made by technology into a set of discrete private decisions.
The very technology that puts us on the common network can allow
us to segment the portion of it that we receive.
What then is the moral of the story? It is that technology has the
capacity to create legal problems such as those associated with
network industries. It also has the capacity to solve those problems.
Lest it be thought that we have not made any progress, we should all
be clear that we are better off having an Internet with inferior
regulations than no Internet at all. The issue is not whether we want
to go back to some earlier order, but how we can do better with the
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technology and legal arrangements that modern technology has
provided.
In thinking about all this, it is critical to note that technology not
only introduces new challenges but obviates older ones. My favorite
illustration of this problem has to do with the classical doctrines of
offer and acceptance in contract law. The nineteenth century case
law was replete with discussions of whether the risk of a mis-sent
offer or acceptance fell on the offeror or offeree. The basic principle
held that the offeror could allocate the risk as he chose. Since that
was rarely done the default rule took over the field. Learned
discussions asked which rule would reduce the level of mis-sent
communications, and the costs associated with those mix-ups. It is
hard to believe that Langdell could rail against the dominant mailbox
rule of Adams v. Linsdell16 that treated an acceptance as binding
when dropped into the post. But he did.17
This debate, however, misses the essential point. No matter what
rule is devised, the error rate from mis-sent communications is too
high. Rather than engage in fine-spun arguments to control its
allocations, technology allows for near instantaneous communications
between the parties so that the gaps and confusions are reduced. In
the limit, if they go to zero, the risk allocation rule becomes
irrelevant. In practice it has become far less important with faxes and
telephones. A body of law that once was critical to basic contract
theory has receded into the side waters. More often than not, any
modem discussion of the rules of contract formation are not
concerned with risk allocation, but with the classical choice of law
question: if the law of the contract is determined by the place of its
formation, then where was it formed? This is just the way it will be in
cyberspace. What law of contract will govern transactions that are
formed in a zillion different locations? Once again the key issue will
be whether an offeror who cares about this issue (e.g., a bank with its
many clients) can make its own rules govern by contract, to which the
answer has to be yes (at least if the designated jurisdiction is chosen
for all its rules, not just those that favor one side).
So the discussion runs its course. The question of whether new
technology requires alteration of old rules is itself an old question that
is insufficiently studied. It is not a new question that requires us to
16. 1 B. & Aid. 681,106 Eng. Rep. 250 (K.B. 1818).
17. See CHRISTOPHER COLUMBUS LANGDELL, A SUMMARY OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
18-19 (2d ed. 1880).
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start from scratch. In general, where private property and
competitive solutions work, we can stick with older legal principles,
and allow technology to transform the terms on which contracts are
made, not the legal framework of the contract law. But once
technology generates the risk of networks and interconnections, the
substantive and jurisdiction issues become more complex. That's the
way it has always been. And that is the way it will always be.
